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An Alien Minor's Ability To Seek Asylum
In The United States Against
Parental Wishes
Give me your tired,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;
Send these, the homeless, tempest-toast to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden doorl 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In July, 1980, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
decided to grant United States asylum to Walter Polovchak pursuant
to the 1980 Refugee Act.2 Five years later, on July 17, 1985, the Dis-
trict Court of Illinois declared this grant of asylum void on the
ground that the INS's asylum procedure, under which Walter had
obtained his grant of asylum, had violated his parents' rights to due
process under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 3
The controversy surrounding Walter's initial grant of asylum
and subsequent withdrawal stems from the fact that Walter was only
twelve years-old at the time of his request. Walter's young age, along
with the asylum procedures followed by the INS in considering his
application for asylum, were the circumstances examined by the court
in deciding whether the INS had acted properly in granting Walter
asylum.4 The court concluded that the INS had violated Walter's
parents' rights to due process by failing to provide for a preliminary
hearing during which the parents could have voiced objection to Wal-
ter's application. Therefore, the court declared the corresponding
grant of asylum void.5
This comment will discuss and analyze the problems with the
1. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 1 (1980)
(quoting E. LAZARRES, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1983)). This quotation also appears on the
Statue of Liberty-the welcoming figure to thousands of refugees.
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (1982)). See infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
3. Polovchak v. Landon, 614 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
4. Id. at 901-03.
5. Id. at 903. The government appealed this decision to the United States Court of
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INS's current policies and procedures in connection with a minor's
petition for asylum. First, however, the conflicting interests which
are necessarily involved when a minor seeks asylum will be pointed
out and discussed. 6 Then it will be revealed how extremely difficult it
is for a minor to successfully seek and maintain asylum under current
law and INS policy. Next, this comment will propose a solution to
the present dilemma by suggesting the implementation of a special
hearing during which the INS could weigh the competing interests
involved and ultimately decide whether the minor's petition for asy-
lum should be granted.
Finally, after defining a set of specific guidelines which should be
applied by the INS in such a special hearing, these guidelines will be
further explored by applying them to the facts surrounding the case of
Walter Polovchak to see whether the INS's initial grant of asylum
would have been proper. 7
II. COMPETING INTERESTS INVOLVED IN GRANTING ASYLUM
To A MINOR
In Polovchak v. Landon,8 the court recognized the existence of
three competing interests which the INS should examine when con-
sidering a minor's application for asylum: 1) the interest of the par-
ents; 2) the interest of the minor; and 3) the interest of the
government. 9 Accordingly, each of these interests must be carefully
examined in light of existing law to determine what rights parents
have over their children, and what rights, if any, children have in-
dependent of their parents. Finally, the INS must explore the govern-
ment's interests in granting an individual asylum. The interests of all
the parties involved must be analyzed and balanced against each other
before any specific procedure can be adopted by the INS in an effort
to successfully grant a minor asylum without violating the due pro-
cess rights of any of the parties involved.
Appeals in Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985). The court in Meese criticized
the lower court for failing to adequately weigh the rights of the child in reaching its decision.
6. The parties whose interests are directly affected by a minor's application for asylum
include: 1) the minor's parents; 2) the minor; and 3) the government. The court in Polovchak
v. Landon placed most of its emphasis upon the interests of the parents; the court hardly
mentioned the minor's interests. See Polovchak v. Landon, 614 F. Supp. at 902-03.
7. This inquiry is moot as to the actual Polovchak case since Walter turned eighteen on
October 3, 1985, and may now apply for asylum on his own, regardless of his parents' desires.
See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 731 (7th Cir. 1985).
8. 614 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
9. Id. at 902-03 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
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A. Parental Rights
One of the basic rights in our country, both historically and in
today's society, is the right to bear and raise children with minimal
state intervention.' 0 Several relatively recent United States Supreme
Court cases have reaffirmed the notion that the family's right to be
free of unnecessary state intrusion is an intrinsic human right which
our country openly recognizes and encourages.'1 This fundamental
right of parental control is recognized as an interest protected by both
the due process clause and by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. ' 2
The constitutional right of parents to make decisions concerning
the upbringing of their children was first articulated in a line of cases
beginning in 1923 with Meyer v. Nebraska.13 In Meyer, the Court
upheld the parents' rights to have their children taught German in a
public school. The Court stated broadly that the right "to marry,
establish a home and bring up children"' 14 was an essential part of the
liberty of parents which was protected by the fourteenth
amendment. 15
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,16 the Court relied upon Meyer in
holding that a state statute, which required every child between the
ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school, violated the constitu-
tional liberty of parents "to direct the upbringing and education" of
their children. 17 The Court further stressed that the child was not
"the mere creature of the state" and that the parents, who nurture
and direct a minor's destiny, have the right to prepare him for future
responsibilities and obligations. 18
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state could not require a mandatory
additional two years of formal education for children against Amish parents' wishes); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute which required every child between the
ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school violated parents' constitutional right to direct
their child's education and upbringing); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents
had the right to have their children taught German in public schools).
11. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977); see also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a state statute forbidding the use of contraceptives
violated the marital right of privacy).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Smith, 431 U.S. at 847-91; Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Id. at 399.
15. Id.
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. Id. at 534-35.
18. Id. at 535.
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Nearly fifty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder,1 9 the Supreme
Court held that the state could not constitutionally influence or deter-
mine the future of Amish children by requiring an additional two
years of formal education.20 The Court stated that "this case involves
the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the
State, to guide the religious future and education of their children."' 2'
Although the holding in Yoder was narrowly limited to its facts, Chief
Justice Burger announced in broad terms that:
[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.
22
Therefore, it appears that through its decisions in Meyer, Pierce,
and Yoder, the Court has recognized that parents have a constitu-
tional right to control and direct the upbringing of their children
without government intervention.
B. Minors' Constitutional Rights
In all of the above-mentioned cases, the conflicts raised were be-
tween parents and state authorities; the children did not express their
own wishes.23 Therefore, the question arises as to whose rights and
liberties should prevail when a direct conflict arises between parents
and their children? A recent series of minors' rights decisions by the
United States Supreme Court has shed some interesting light on what
the answer to this question might be.24
Historically, minors were thought of as mere family "chattels"
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. Id. at 234.
21. Id. at 232.
22. Id.
23. Although the majority in Yoder expressly concluded that the issue of the children's
rights to attend high school contrary to their parents' wishes had not been presented in the
case, language in Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court suggested that the right of par-
ents to guide the upbringing of their children was considered paramount. Yoder, 406 U.S. at
230-31.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (minors are afforded the constitutional rights to due
process, notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and the privilege against self-in-
crimination); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (constitutional right to
free speech is extended to minors participating in an anti-Vietnam display); Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (in light of a minor's right to privacy, state may not
place a total ban on the distribution of non-medical contraceptives to minors under the age of
sixteen); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (statute voided which required
[Vol. 9:169
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and occupied the lowest rung on the colonial American social lad-
der.25 In the early history of our country, children were subject to the
harshest punishments for relatively trivial offenses. 26 They assumed a
completely subservient position within the family unit and a parent's
right to a minor child's services and wages was deemed absolute. 27
It was not until the early 1900's, through a growth in the use of
the parens patriae principle, 28 that the state would, in special circum-
stances, intervene in family affairs to safeguard the best interests of
the child. 29 Still, it was not until the 1960's that the rights of children,
in and of themselves, were recognized by the Court.30 Today, it is
well-established that minors are vested with the constitutional rights
to notice, 31 counsel, 32 confrontation, 33 and cross-examination. 34 Mi-
parental consent as an absolute condition for an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion as it
was anathema to the minor's constitutional right to privacy).
25. See Katz, Schoeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children - Coming of Legal Age in
America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 212 (1973).
26. Id. at 212. The death penalty was a possible punishment for any child convicted of
violating the early Stubborn Child Law which was enacted in Massachusetts in 1654. The Law
punished those children who behaved themselves "too disrespectively, disobediently and disor-
derly toward their parents, masters and governors." See 3 N. SHURTLEFF, RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONY IN NEW ENGLAND 355
(1853-54). This Law, which is still on the books, was recently upheld as being constitutional in
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975), summarily aff'd, 428
U.S. 901 (1976). The Poe court stated: "At common law, minors were charges of the family
and state, legally unable to act for themselves. [citations omitted]. The law did not distinguish
between the infant and the mature teenager, treating them both as the property of their par-
ents, who could make all decisions affecting them." Id. at 789.
28. The doctrine ofparens patriae originated in the English Court of Chancery, and pro-
vided that the Crown had the power to protect those subjects who were unable to protect
themselves, such as children and incompetents. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 666
(Ch. 1725); Johnstone v. Beattie, 8 Eng. Rep. 657, 687 (H.L. 1843); Wellesley v. Bequfort, 38
Eng. Rep. 236, 241 (Ch. 1827). Thereafter, the doctrine was incorporated into the common
law of this country. See generally Note, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process
in Child Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1975) (discussion of the history of
parenspatriae doctrine); Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J.
195 (1978) (excellent historical discussion of parens patriae doctrine).
29. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court relied upon
the doctrine ofparens patriae in holding that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the
public interest," and neither are the "rights of parenthood beyond limitation." Id. at 166.
30. The landmark case of the so-called children's rights cases was Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). In dictum, the Court stated that "[t]he protection of the Constitution
extends to all." Id. at 401.
31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id. at 42-47.
34. Id.
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nors also enjoy the constitutional right of free speech3 5 as well as the
privileges against self-incrimination 36 and double-jeopardy.
3 7 Still
other courts have recognized a minor's right to privacy in the area of
contraceptives and abortion: both may now be obtained by a minor
without having to first acquire parental consent.
38
The landmark decision which first affirmatively recognized a mi-
nor's right to procedural due process was In re Gault.39 In Gault, the
Supreme Court observed that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'' ° Gault dealt with the
requirements of due process surrounding juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. The Court held that procedural due process required that
notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and the right to cross-examination be accorded to juveniles in such
proceedings.4' However, since Gault also held that the parents must
be notified of the right to counsel, the case may be read as protecting
the mutual interests of both parents and children.
42
Tinker v. Des Moines43 is the United States Supreme Court case
which is most often cited as having extended to minors the rights set
forth in the first amendment. In Tinker, the petitioners, three school
children, publicized their objections to the Vietnam War by wearing
black armbands to school. School officials subsequently decided to
adopt a policy whereby any student wearing an armband to school
would be suspended until the armband was removed.
The Supreme Court held such regulation by a school district un-
35. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
37. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
38. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
39. Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 31-34.
42. Id. at 41-42. On the question of whether such rights are waivable by the parents over
the wishes of the minor, see Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (the compe-
tence of a 17-year-old criminal defendant to waive his right to counsel is a question of fact).
See Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Minors: A Question of Law or Fact?, 19 HASTINGS
L. J. 223 (1967); see also People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 378-79 (1967) (minor may make an
intelligent and knowing waiver of constitutional rights without the consent or approval of a
parent, guardian or attorney). Some states, such as California, have made it clear that compe-
tent waivers by minors are not to be prohibited. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West
1973), which provides "[n]othing in this section... is intended by the Legislature to prohibit a
minor from exercising an intelligent and knowing waiver of his constitutional rights in any
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Law."
43. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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constitutional. 44 In support of its conclusion, the Court advanced two
arguments: first, that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of
expressing certain views was within the free speech clause of the first
amendment;45 second, that first amendment rights are applicable to
students since "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'per-
sons' under our Constitution."' 46 However, in the concurring opinion
to Tinker, Justice Stewart revealed certain misgivings to the effect
that minors might not have adequate capacities to make the sort of
choice that the majority was willing to give them.4 7
The Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that children are
'persons' under the Constitution and therefore possess certain consti-
tutional rights. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth,48 the Court declared unconstitutional part of a Missouri
abortion statute requiring an unmarried minor female to acquire the
consent of her parent(s) or guardian(s) in order to have an abortion
performed. 49 Justice Blackmun, delivering the majority opinion,
stated that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and pos-
sess constitutional rights." 50 Thus, the Court voided the state abor-
tion statute on the ground that it violated a minor's right to privacy.5 1
44. Id. at 504-05.
45. Id. at 508.
46. Id. at 511.
47. Id. at 515. Justice Stewart's concurrence stemmed in part, no doubt, from the
Court's previous decision and rationale set forth in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968). In Ginsberg, the Court found that it was constitutionally permissible for New York to
accord minors a more restricted right than adults to determine for themselves what sex mate-
rial they read. Id.
48. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
49. Id. at 72-75.
50. Id. at 74. While Justice Blackmun acknowledged that minors' constitutional rights
may, in fact, vest before the state-defined age of majority, nowhere in his opinion does he state
exactly when or under what conditions such rights should vest. However, in a subsequent
case, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the Court stated that under a state statute which
required parental consent before a minor could seek an abortion, every minor must have the
opportunity to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If the
minor satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make an intelligent
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consent. Id.
at 643-44. Thus, it appears that a minor's independent constitutional rights, at least in the area
of privacy, vest at that point in time when the minor can demonstrate his or her maturity to
the court. As the Court in Bellotti stated, "[w]e... cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and fully
competent to assess the implications of the choice she has made." Id. at 650.
51. 428 U.S. at 72-75.
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A minor's right to privacy was again invoked in Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International.5 2 In that case, the Court overturned a
New York law which prohibited the distribution of nonprescriptive
contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen. The Court held
that the right to privacy, at least in connection with decisions affect-
ing procreation, extended to minors as well as adults.53 Since a state
could not impose a prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of pa-
rental consent, on a minor's choice to seek an abortion,5 4 "the consti-
tutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of
contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed." 55
While the above cited cases appear to broadly extend constitu-
tional protections to minors, several recent Supreme Court decisions
have arguably restricted such rights where strong and compelling
state reasons exist for doing so.5 6
C. Governmental Interests
1. In acting as a substitute parent: the doctrine of parens patriae
The power of the government to remove a child from the custody
of her parents in order to protect the child's best interests has roots
deep in American history. 57 Through the parens patriae doctrine, 58
equity courts in the early nineteenth century exercised their power to
remove a child from parental custody and to appoint a suitable person
to act as guardian.59
Two relatively recent United States Supreme Court decisions
which applied the doctrine of parens patriae in order to allow state
intervention in the area of parental control and direction are Prince v.
Massachusetts6° and Ginsberg v. New York. 61 In Prince, the Court
upheld as constitutional a state statute which prohibited minors from
52. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
53. Id. at 693.
54. Id. at 694.
55. Id.
56. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state has a strong interest in protecting
a minor's welfare and well-being); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (state has
strong independent grounds for protecting a minor's morals).
57. See generally S. Fox, MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 19 (1972) (a good discussion of
early attempts to provide treatment for neglected and delinquent minors prior to the develop-
ment of juvenile courts).
58. See supra note 28.
59. Id.
60. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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publicly distributing Jehovah's Witnesses literature, even with the
consent and under the direction of the minors' parents.62 The Court
stressed that despite the acknowledged right of parents to control and
direct the upbringing of their children, the "state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting
the child's welfare."'63 The Court emphasized that in public activities
and in matters of employment, the state has a vested interest in ensur-
ing the healthy and well-rounded growth of its youth into full matur-
ity, as it is the youth who will one day be responsible for running our
democratic society.
64
Similarly, in Ginsberg, the Court found it constitutionally per-
missible for New York to accord minors under the age of seventeen a
more restrictive right than adults to judge and determine for them-
selves what sex material they read.65  The Court appeared to rely
upon the line of reasoning set forth in Prince, which stated that "the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adults."'66
Although the Court in Ginsberg appeared to place great reliance
upon its earlier decision set forth in Prince, it placed a different em-
phasis upon the state's interest in overriding parental decisions. In
Prince, the "best interests" and welfare of the minor were the primary
focus of the Court's attention.67 In Ginsberg, however, the Court rec-
ognized that the state, as well as the child, had an independent inter-
est in the minor's well-being. 68
In light of these and several other United States Supreme Court
decisions,69 it appears that when the state has a legitimate interest 70 in
protecting a minor's welfare and well-being, the state may be able,
62. Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70.
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 168.
65. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638-40.
66. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
67. Id. at 170.
68. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
69. Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (in neglect proceedings, state
has an "urgent interest" in the welfare of the child).
70. The underlying principle seems to be that when the state seeks to contravene parental
decisions in the area of child rearing with the claimed purpose of benefitting the child, the state
must present a strong and convincing case that its intervention will, in fact, serve its professed
goal. If a strong and convincing case cannot be made, the state will be unable to usurp con-
trary parental decisions. See also Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977) (the
Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the state had a legitimate interest in
protecting minors' morality through regulation of contraceptives).
1986]
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under the doctrine of parens patriae, to override parental wishes con-
cerning the upbringing of the minor.
2. In granting an individual's request for asylum
a. prior to 1980
At the very beginning of our country's history, our founding fa-
thers' philosophy included the belief that America should provide
sanctuary to those persons fleeing persecution in their native home-
land.71 Asylum would be granted to any alien facing religious, polit-
ical, or racial persecution if forced to return to his native land. 7
2
The present source of United States asylum law arises from the
United States' 1968 ratification of the United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees. 73 The Protocol was an extension and
reaffirmation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, 74 in which the United States did not participate.
The Protocol extended the Convention's protection to any refu-
gee who had a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. ' ' 75 Those refugees qualifying under this definition
could claim the protection of Article 33, the Protocol's asylum provi-
sion, which provided that "[n]o contracting state shall expel or return
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion."
'76
Before the United States joined the Protocol, the chief Federal
law providing relief to refugees who would face persecution if re-
turned to their homeland was section 243(h) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952. 77 As originally drafted, this section ex-
71. D. CARLINER, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 53 (1977); Evans, The Political Refugee in
United States Immigration Law & Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204, 204 (1969); Note, The Right of
Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 539, 539 (1981).
72. D. CARLINER, supra note 71, at 53-54.
73. Opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.N.T.S. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
74. Opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention].
75. Convention art. 1, para. 2, at 152 (as adopted by Protocol art. 1, para. 2, 606
U.N.T.S. at 268).
76. Convention art. 33, para. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176 (as adopted by Protocol, supra note
73).
77. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243, 66 Stat. 163, 212-14 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1981)).
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tended protection only to those individuals who would be probable
victims of "physical" persecution. 78  However, section 243(h) was
amended in 1965 to read: "The Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any
country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, or political opinion. .. .
While section 243(h) provides essentially the same protections as
later set forth in Article 33 of the Protocol,80 section 243(h) was dis-
cretionary, unlike the provisions of Article 33. Thus, section 243(h)
did not prevent the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration
Appeals from deporting aliens who did, in fact, face actual persecu-
tion back home.8 1
Prior to the Protocol, the only method whereby an alien could
actually seek a grant of asylum, in certain limited circumstances, was
under the "conditional entry" procedure of section 203(a)(7) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act. 82 However, after the Protocol
was adopted, its provisions undeniably became part of the supreme
law of the land8 3 and controlled any case in conflict with the prior
acts of Congress. 84 In fact, the 1980 Refugee Act was enacted primar-
ily to conform United States law with its obligations under the
Protocol.85
b. after 1980
The 1980 Refugee Act amends section 243(h) to conform to the
terms of the Protocol and reflects a desire to expand statutory United
States asylum law in order to give greater effect to the purposes of the
78. Id.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1 l(f), 79 Stat. 918 (1965).
80. There was, however, one major exception: section 243(h) applied only to "deportable
aliens", whereby the Protocol applied to all qualified aliens.
81. Section 243(h) "authorized" rather than required the withholding of deportation. See
supra note 79. Courts interpreted the change of language in 1952 as indicating congressional
intent to make relief discretionary. See U.S. ex rel. Moon v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); U.S. ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392, 394 (2nd Cir. 1953).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(c)(3), 94 Stat.
102, 107 (1980). To qualify under this section, an alien had to have fled because of a fear of
persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion from a communist country or a
country in the Middle East and be unable or unwilling to return on account of race, religion, or
political opinion.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
84. See Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313 (1973); Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102,
118 (1933).
85. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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Protocol. 86 Under section 208(a) of the Act, 87 the Attorney General
must establish a procedure for the granting of asylum to aliens who
qualify as "refugees" within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).88
However, the ultimate determination of an asylum request under sec-
tion 208(a) is clearly discretionary rather than mandatory; therefore,
the Attorney General is free to deny asylum even to qualified
individuals.89
The persecution standard in Article 33 of the Protocol, as well as
section 208(a) of the 1980 Refugee Act, has been defined in terms of a
threat to an alien's "life or freedom." 90 The threat to life or freedom
need not be purely physical as was the case prior to the Protocol and
1980 Act; under current case law, "persecution" has been defined as
"the infliction of suffering or harm. . . in a way regarded as
offensive." 91
The likelihood of future persecution must also be demonstrated
by an alien before asylum can be granted.92 Thus, a showing of past
86. The Act removed the discretionary language of section 243(h) and replaced "persecu-
tion" with "life or freedom would be threatened" and added "nationality" and "membership
of a particular social group" to "race, religion, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1980). See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
87. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)).
88. Id. at § 1 101(a)(42)(A). Section 101(a)(42)(A) provides that:
the term 'refugee' means... any person.., who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persection on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
89. See supra note 87. But see Cardoza - Fonseca v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985)
(although the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to qualified refugees, the deter-
mination of "refugee" status depends on actual findings).
However, even if a refugee's application for asylum is denied under section 208(a), if the
alien faces actual persecution upon returning home, section 143(h) mandates that the alien not
be deported until the threat of persecution disappears since after the passage of the 1980 Refu-
gee Act, section 243(h) provides that the "Attorney General shall not deport. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1980).
90. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
91. Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969),
was the first court opinion to apply the new standard of non-physical persecution. In Kovac, a
Yugoslav merchant seaman claimed that his government had persecuted him by preventing
him from working as a highly skilled chef, forcing him instead to work as an unskilled cook.
The Board applied the old "physical persecution" standard, and concluded that Kovac had
not shown the requisite degree of threatened harm. The court of appeals rejected this conclu-
sion and asserted that a showing of substantial economic disadvantage could be sufficient to
meet the amended persecution standard of "offensive" harm or suffering. Id. at 107. See also
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1685 (1965) (defining the word
"offensive").
92. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 2d(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102.
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harm or suffering might not, in and of itself, support a grant of asy-
lum. 93 Courts have interpreted this provision as requiring a "well-
founded fear" that must be rational rather than purely subjective.
94
An alien must also show that his former government is in some
way responsible for the harm threatened.95 An alien need not show
that its government itself will carry out the persecution; an alien's
demonstration that his government is unwilling or unable to prevent
the persecution by private individuals or groups is sufficient.
9 6
If an alien is able to satisfy all of the above requirements, the
United States has demonstrated, through its adoption of the Protocol
and 1980 Refugee Act, that it will be willing to grant the alien
asylum.
III. CRITICISM OF EXISTING LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON A
MINOR'S APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM
When a minor decides to seek asylum against the wishes of his
parents, his own interests in choosing where to reside are thrown
against the rights of his parents to raise their child in the manner and
environment they feel best. While family conflicts are normally re-
solved at the state level, 97 the federal government's statutory obliga-
93. Past persecution might, however, provide the best evidence of the likelihood of future
persecution.
94. Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 318-19 (1973) (Immigration Appeals Board
found that an alien's fear of criminal prosecution in Hungary for having departed illegally was
not a sufficient showing that the penalty imposed for illegal departure would be so severe as to
be considered persecution). The Board stated that "[a] fear which is illusory, neurotic or para-
noid, however sincere, does not meet this [well-founded fear of future persecution] require-
ment." Id. at 319. See also Ishak v. District Director, 432 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1977). In
Ishak, the court found newspaper clippings insufficient evidence of persecution, insisting in-
stead that the alien's testimony be corroborated by independent sources. Id. at 626.
95. See Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (1967) (an ethnic Chinese alien's petition
for asylum was rejected when the alien was unable to show that his Indonesian Government
was either unable or unwilling to control the mobs of citizens who were allegedly persecuting
the ethnic Chinese).
96. Id. at 568. Subsequent decisions have also applied the standard of "unable or unwill-
ing" in deciding when a government should be held responsible for private persecution in order
to grant an alien's request for asylum. See, e.g., Rosa v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Matter of Pierre, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim
Dec. No. 2433 (1975); see also Leung v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 166
(3rd Cir. 1976) (remanded case to Board in order to determine if Hong Kong police had
known that seamen's union had threatened petitioner because of his political beliefs, but none-
theless had failed to act).
97. "Family disputes are usually handled at the state level because of the special expertise
of local agencies in matters of domestic relations." Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 734 (7th
Cir. 1985).
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tion to provide sanctuary to those threatened with religious or other
persecution places the burden of mediator on the INS.
98
In order to protect the constitutional rights of both minor and
parents, the INS must provide for a special hearing in which the inter-
ests and rights of all the affected parties can be brought out and ex-
amined.99 It is the INS's present failure in providing any guidelines
for such a hearing that seriously undermines the ability of a minor to
successfully seek asylum against the wishes of his parents without vio-
lating either the minor's or the parents' rights to due process.100
Under current INS policy, the focus in determining eligibility for
asylum is on the individual applicant alone, without inquiry as to
whether there are others who are affected by the asylum request. The
age of the applicant plays a much smaller role than does the country
of origin the applicant is fleeing from or the political ramifications in
granting or denying the asylum request.' 0 ' Thus, when a minor has
tried to apply for asylum, the INS has simply looked to see if the
minor, under the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act, is an individual
qualified to receive a grant of asylum. No inquiry is made as to the
minor's parents' desires. No questions are asked to determine the
mental maturity of the minor in order to see whether he is even capa-
ble of making such an important decision in a thoughtful and well-
considered manner. Furthermore, even when parents do voice strong
objection to a minor's application for asylum, there are no procedures
provided for whereby such objections can be carefully examined and
weighed. 0 2 Thus, even if the INS concludes that the minor does
qualify for asylum under the provisions set forth in the 1980 Refugee
Act, the parents of such a minor would be able to successfully attack
the grant on the grounds that their due process rights had been
98. This statutory obligation is found in the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
§ 101(a)(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified as notes to 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1982)).
99. Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 738.
100. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the due process guarantees of
the fifth amendment apply to resident aliens as well at to citizens. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915).
101. In the Polovchak case, even the Supreme Court of Illinois commented that, in its
opinion, "we do not doubt that the multiple litigation and controversy surrounding this case
have also adversely affected what should otherwise have been a prompt determination regard-
ing Walter's custody." In re Polovchak, 97 III.2d 212, 216, 454 N.E. 2d 258, 262 (Sup. Ct. Ill.
1983). In addition, the fact that it was the Soviet Union where Walter's parents wanted to take
him back was commented on by several newspaper articles which then went on to debate the
merits of the Polovchak controversy. E.g. L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1981, at 1; The Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Jan. 15, 1981, at 1-B, col. 1.
102. This was the court's main criticism in Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 735.
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violated. 103
Although a grant of asylum to a minor does not always work as a
complete termination of parental rights, such is the practical effect
where the parents are desirous of returning to their native homeland.
Therefore, before the INS can intervene and grant a minor asylum,
thereby terminating the parents' constitutional rights to direct and
control their child's upbringing, the INS must strictly adhere to the
requirements of procedural due process.' °4
After a close examination of the Polovchak case, it appears that
the INS failed to consider all of the ramifications involved in receiving
a minor's application for asylum. By failing to provide for a hearing
prior to the grant of an asylum request or departure control order,10 5
the INS fails to adequately protect the due process rights of all the
interested parties. The result is that the INS has made it extremely
difficult for a minor to successfully maintain a grant of asylum.
Although it might be relatively easy for a minor to obtain the initial
grant of asylum, as this would be issued by the INS without a special
hearing, such a grant could later be withdrawn at the parents' insis-
tence on the grounds that such a grant violated their rights to proce-
dural due process.
IV. PROPOSAL
In light of the apparent difficulty of a minor to successfully seek
and maintain asylum in the United States under existing INS policy
and against parental wishes, 10 6 a new procedure must be adopted by
the INS since minors, as well as adults, have certain inalienable rights
which have constitutional protection.10 7 As mentioned previously,
the Supreme Court has recognized that minors do possess certain con-
stitutional rights and protections independent of their parents.108
103. Id. at 736.
104. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Serv-
ices, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
105. A departure control order prevents an alien from leaving the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1982). Once an alien becomes the subject of a departure control order, the alien may
then, after the order has been issued, request a hearing at which time the order will be re-
viewed and either finalized or revoked. 8 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (1985).
106. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985).
107. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutionally recog-
nized rights which minors possess). Further, as the court in Meese stated, "[a] minor seeking
political asylum, if sufficiently mature, should have his wishes heard and taken into account."
Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 737.
108. See supra note 107.
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However, as stated earlier, there is a very strong tendency in our
country not to allow governmental interference in the manner in
which parents decide to raise their children. °9 This tendency heavily
favors the denial of a minor's request for asylum if such a request is
against his parents' wishes. Accordingly, the real issue is whether a
minor's right to seek asylum should take precedence over his parents'
constitutional right to control the child's destiny and upbringing. 10
One possible solution would be for the INS to conduct a bifur-
cated hearing during which the conflicting interests of all the parties
involved would be brought out and resolved before deciding whether
a minor should be granted asylum.
The first stage of the proposed hearing would be conducted in an
effort to see whether the minor applying for asylum qualified for such
a grant under the current 1980 Refugee Act."' If the minor was un-
able to meet the qualifications set forth in the Act, any further inquiry
into the conflicting interests of the parents would be unnecessary and
the minor's application for asylum would be denied.1 1 2 However, if
the individual qualified for asylum under the requirements of the Act,
the second stage of the proposed INS hearing would be conducted.
This second stage would identify and examine several specific areas
relevant to the question of whether a grant of asylum should be made
to the minor, since such a grant would necessitate that the state take
custody of the minor away from his parents.
During this second stage of the hearing, the first inquiry would
be to see whether the minor would face not only persecution in a man-
ner regarded as "offensive," which would satisfy the requirements of
the 1980 Refugee Act, but whether the minor would face actual life-
threatening circumstances if forced to return home with his parents.
If this were found to be the true state of affairs surrounding the mi-
nor's application for asylum, then the INS could stop with any fur-
109. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text. The court in Polovchak v. Meese ac-
knowledged that "It]he district court may be correct that parents have the right to bring up
their children as atheists or Communists." 774 F.2d at 737.
110. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 736. The court stated that "we do not necessar-
ily agree with the district court that the 'private interest of . . Walter... is by its very nature
considerably less than that of his parents.'" Id.
111. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
112. Thus a minor would need to show: 1) that he faced actual persecution if forced to
return home; 2) that the persecution was due to the alien's religion, membership in a particular
social group, race, political opinion, or nationality; and 3) that his government was either
unable or unwilling to prevent the persecution. See also supra note 2 and notes 87-97 and
accompanying text.
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ther inquiries and grant asylum under the theory of parens patriae.113
On the other hand, if the persecution facing the minor upon his return
home was anything less than life-threatening, the INS would next
have to turn to several other areas of concern before it would be able
to make an informed decision as to whether to grant the minor's asy-
lum request.
Four specific areas which should be weighed by the INS in ulti-
mately deciding whether a minor's petition for asylum should be
granted include:
1) the minor's actual age and mental maturity;
2) the possible relatives with whom the minor could live in the
United States if asylum were granted;
3) the overall best interests of the minor which would be served
or harmed if the minor were to remain in the United States rather
than return to his home country; and
4) the parents' substantial interests in raising their child in the
manner which they deem appropriate.
As the minor's age approaches the age of majority, greater
weight should be given to the minor's desire to remain in the United
States. If the minor is between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, a
presumption could exist that the minor is mentally capable of decid-
ing what is in his best interests: either returning home where the
threat of persecution existed, or remaining in the United States.
On the other hand, if a minor is under the age of sixteen, the INS
would need to look at the individual's mental maturity to see whether
the minor is, in fact, able to make an intelligent decision to remain in
the United States without his or her parents. The younger a minor is,
the more difficult it should be for the minor to successfully demon-
strate the sufficient mental capacity needed to override his parents's
determination of what is in the child's best interests. 114
The second consideration which should be looked at by the INS
are the circumstances surrounding the minor's home-life here in the
United States. For example, are there other relatives in the minor's
family with whom he has close contact and with whom he could live
if a grant of asylum were issued? Also, are the relatives the ones
113. See generally supra note 28 (discussion of parens patriae doctrine). See also text at
notes 57-59.
114. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979). In Bellotti, the Court goes through a
similar analysis in order to determine whether a minor is mentally mature enough to make the
decision to obtain an abortion without having to first obtain her parents' permission. Id.
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pushing the minor in deciding to seek asylum or is it really the deci-
sion of the minor himself? 1 5 Lastly, if there are no relatives with
whom the minor could remain if asylum were granted, would there be
a family willing to take in the minor or would the minor wind up in a
juvenile home?
The third consideration focuses upon the overall best interests of
the minor. Although it will have already been determined that the
minor does in fact face persecution if forced to return home, 1 6 only
strong state reasons for protecting the minor's best interests and wel-
fare will enable the state to deprive the parents of their right to con-
trol the destiny and upbringing of their child. 17 Accordingly, it is at
this point when the parents' interests in deciding how to best raise and
prepare their child for future responsibilities enters into the analysis.
If the parents could somehow make a showing that the child would
not be put in a life-threatening situation upon returning home with
them, it is possible that the government would defer to the parents'
decision in light of the recognized right of parents to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit. The fact that the child would be returned to a
communist country should not, in and of itself, strip away the par-
ents' interests in raising their child. However, since the government
has an independent interest in the minor's well-being,1 8 it might
reach the conclusion that the harm facing the minor upon returning
home is so great or serious that it outweighs any interests that the
parents might have.
Accordingly, if the government felt that the child faced serious
harm upon returning home and the parents were unable to advance
reasons why their interests should take precedence over the minor's,
the INS would be able to permanently grant asylum to the minor so
long as the minor's decision to remain was made knowingly, intelli-
gently, and freely.
115. This factor would go toward determining whether the minor was, in fact, mentally
mature and capable enough to resist outside pressures and make an independent decision re-
garding his own best interests.
116. By qualifying under the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 2.
117. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see also McGough and Shindell, Com-
ing ofAge: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27
EMORY L. J. 209 (1978) (general discussion on the conflicting interests necessarily involved in
custody disputes).
118. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
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V. APPLICATION AND RESULT IN APPLYING THE PROPOSED
HEARING PROCEDURE To A MINOR'S REQUEST
FOR ASYLUM
A. Facts Surrounding In re Polovchak
The dilemma of Walter Polovchak and his parents dates back to
the beginning of 1980. In January of 1980, Walter's family arrived in
the United States from the Soviet Union pursuant to a grant of parole
by the United States Attorney General.1 19 The family subsequently
settled down in an Ukrainian-American suburb near Chicago. The
parents began working while twelve year-old Walter and his older sis-
ter began school. Soon after their arrival, however, a conflict arose
between Walter's parents and various relatives who attempted to con-
vert the family from Ukrainian Catholicism to the Ukrainian Baptist
Church. As life became more difficult for Walter's parents, 20 they
eventually decided in May of 1980 to return home to the Soviet
Union. 121
This decision, however, was not welcomed by the two eldest
Polovchak children. Accordingly, seventeen year-old Natalie and her
younger brother Walter, picked up their belongings and moved to an
apartment to stay with their cousins. Though the parents acknowl-
edged and respected Natalie's decision to stay in the United States,
they were determined to have Walter return home with them.
22
On July 18, 1980, Walter's parents went to a Chicago police sta-
tion and reported their son missing. The police quickly found Walter
and brought him to the Area Youth Division. Walter, who was
quickly provided with an attorney by the Ukrainian-American com-
munity, told police that "he had run away from home because he did
not want to return to the Ukraine with his family."' 23 The local po-
lice then quickly contacted the INS and the Department of State for a
determination of a possible asylum request. At the same time, a spe-
119. Gottlieb, The Boy With Two Countries, 11 FAM. RTs. 18, 18 (Summ. 1983). Under 8
U.S.C. 1182(d)(5) (1982), the Attorney General may allow the entrance of foreign nationals
for indefinite time periods under "such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." While the parole program is normally
invoked to help the alien, as in the Polovchak case, the Attorney General has successfully used
it for the purpose of prosecuting aliens for smuggling. Klapholz v. Esperdy, 201 F. Supp. 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
120. Walter's parents spoke no English; his mother worked all day while his father worked
all night. See Gottlieb, supra note 116, at 18.
121. Id.
122. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 732 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).
123. In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App. 3d 203, 206, 432 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1981).
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cial agent told police that the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher, had ordered that the child not be returned to his par-
ents. 124 The very next day, a formal application for religious asylum
was filed by Walter pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act. 125
B. Determination of Walter Polovchak's Request for Asylum
Applying the bifurcated hearing procedure proposed above, the
INS's first line of inquiry would be to see whether Walter qualified for
asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act. 126 Since a finding contrary to
the provisions of the Act would end our analysis, and there would be
no need to have a hearing to examine the conflicting interests of Wal-
ter and his parents, an assumption will be made that Walter would
have qualified for asylum under the 1980 Refugee Act. 127
Once the INS found that Walter's asylum request qualified under
the Act, the second part of the proposed hearing would have weighed
the conflicting interests of Walter, his parents, and the government.
Since Walter was only twelve years-old at the time of his petition for
asylum, the INS would have been unable to invoke any form of pre-
sumption that would have made it clear that Walter had the mental
124. The next problem dealt with by the local police was the question of which legal au-
thority could be involved to carry out the federal instructions to keep Walter apart from his
parents. Acting on the advice of an associate Circuit Court Judge, the police decided to treat
Walter as a runaway under the Illinois Minors in Need of Supervision (MINS) statute. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-3(l)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). It was the choice of using MINS
in order to keep Walter out of the custody of his parents which became the basis for the
litigation surrounding In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App. 3d 203, 432 N.E. 2d 873 (1981).
Warren Christopher's involvement can be explained by Pub. L. No. 82-414 § 104(a)
which provides: "[T]he Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration and en-
forcement of the provisions of this Act [Refugee Act] and all other immigration and national-
ity laws." Id.
125. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)). Walter's application was based upon the threat of "religious"
persecution. Walter's application stated that his religion was Baptist and if he were forced to
return to the Soviet Union, he would be "persecuted. . .[,] prevented from higher education,
considered suspect [and] restricted in mobility." See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 733.
126. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
127. It is questionable whether Walter could have qualified for a grant of asylum under the
Refugee Act of 1980. Walter's basis for seeking asylum was under a claim that "religious"
persecution faced him if he were forced to return to a predominately Catholic, Ukrainian
community. Walter alleged in his petition that since he had converted to the Ukrainian Bap-
tist Church, he would be a persecuted minority back in the Soviet Union. It is doubtful,
however, whether Walter could have been so quickly and deeply indoctrinated into a new
religion, as he had been in the United States for a mere five months at the time of his request
for asylum. Therefore, some measure of doubt exists regarding whether he would have faced
actual persecution for his conversion back home.
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maturity and capacity to decide that his best interests would be served
by remaining in the United States. Accordingly, the INS would have
had to make a factual determination of whether Walter could have
made an intelligent and knowing decision to remain in the United
States.
In order to make such a factual determination, Walter's relation-
ship with his relatives and friends would need to be explored. If the
pressures from such friends and relatives to remain in the United
States were the reasons behind his decision, it would appear question-
able whether Walter did in fact make an intelligent and knowing
choice. Such a bending to the pressures exerted by peers and relatives
would tend to support a factual finding that Walter was not mentally
mature and capable enough to decide for himself what was in his best
interests. Accordingly, Walter's parents' determination as to how his
interests would be best served would enter into the analysis and would
tend to tip the balance toward the denial of his application. Assum-
ing, however, that Walter was mature enough to reach the decision
that he was better off remaining in the United States, the INS's focus
would next shift to the circumstances surrounding Walter's home-life
here in the United States.
At the time Walter decided to remain in the United States, he
had lived here for just over five months. During this time, Walter had
enrolled in a public school and had struck up many friendships
among his peers. In addition, Walter had become close to several of
his parents' relatives who had been domiciled in the United States for
many years. In fact, it was the family relatives who initially exposed
Walter to the Baptist religion, which ultimately gave him the basis
upon which to seek religious asylum.1 28 It was further apparent that
there existed numerous relatives who would have been pleased to take
care of Walter if his petition for asylum were granted.
The final inquiry which the INS would have had to make con-
cerns the balancing of the parents' interests with those of both Walter
and the government in order to determine how Walter's overall best
interests would be served.
According to the facts surrounding the Polovchaks' desire to re-
turn to the Soviet Union, it seems they were willing to acknowledge
128. The Refugee Act of 1980 expressly recognizes that a threat of religious persecution is
a form of persecution which would enable an alien to successfully apply for asylum. See 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h); see also supra note 128.
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their daughter Natalie's decision to remain in the United States. 129
Consequently, if Walter was allowed to stay in the United States pur-
suant to a grant of asylum, the Polovchaks would have been forced to
return home without either of their children to care for and raise.
However, in light of all of the relatives with whom Walter could have
stayed, coupled with his strong and apparently mature decision that
his best interests would be served by remaining in the United States
where he would be free to practice his newly adopted religion, the
interests of Walter and the government would have outweighed his
parents' interests and the INS would have acted properly in granting
Walter asylum.
VI. CONCLUSION
On October 3, 1985, Walter Polovchak turned eighteen years-
old. As a result, the Illinois District Court's opinion in Polovchak v.
Landon 130 became moot. The controversy, however, surrounding the
Polovchak case, has not yet dissipated. Though Walter's attainment
of the age of majority enables him to apply for asylum on his own,
irrespective of the desires or concerns of his parents, there will no
doubt be future "Walter Polovchaks" who will one day seek asylum
here in the United States.131 Since the INS has yet to take any appar-
ent steps to assure that future parties involved in such a situation will
be afforded their guaranteed constitutional rights to procedural due
process, the question of whether any minor could successfully receive
129. See supra note 122.
130. Polovchak v. Landon, 614 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
131. In August of 1983, Polovchak was revisited by an apparent asylum request from the
son of a Soviet diplomat. On August 10, 1983, the United States Department of State was
notified by the Soviet Embassy in Washington that the son of first secretary Valentin M. Ber-
ezhkov had taken his parents' car from their suburban home and had not returned. The fol-
lowing day the Embassy reported to the State Department that Berezhkov had returned home
on his own.
That same day, the Washington office of the New York Times received a letter signed by
"Andy Berezhkov." The letter read, in part, "I hate my country and it's [sic] rules and I love
your country.... I want to stay here. So I'm running away." N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1983, at
A l, col. 5. Upon learning of the letters, the State Department issued a request to the Soviet
Embassy to interview the youth; the request was denied by the Embassy. At the request of the
State Department, the INS issued an order preventing the youth's departure from the United
States. Secret Service agents stood guard at the Embassy's compound, and the Berezhkov's
home was put under surveillance. Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1983, at Al1, col. 2.
On August 18, the stalemate ended when Andy told reporters that he had no desire to
stay in the United States, that his drive around the city had been misinterpreted, and that he
wished that the United States authorities would let him return to the Soviet Union. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
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and maintain a grant of United States asylum is still undecided.13 2
In light of the recent string of cases recognizing minors' rights to
equal protection and due process, 33 the INS must implement new
procedures for determining asylum requests by minors if such re-
quests are ever to be seriously considered. Without such affirmative
action by the INS, it will remain very difficult for the government to
take custody of a child away from his parents, even if the alternative
would result in the minor being subjected to actual religious or polit-
ical persecution. '34
Given the history of the United States' desire to accommodate
aliens facing persecution in their country of origin, if an alien faces an
actual threat of persecution back home, the mere age of the alien
should not, in and of itself, deprive that individual of the opportunity
to successfully petition for a grant of United States asylum.
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132. This statement assumes that the applicant for asylum does not use the court system to
delay the final determination to a point in time whereby the question of asylum for the minor
becomes moot. This is exactly what happened in the Polovchak case. The attorneys for both
the government and Walter took so much time in their appeals that Walter finally turned
eighteen, which necessarily rendered the entire issue of asylum moot since Walter can now
apply for asylum as an adult.
133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also supra notes 34-55 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 132. Accordingly, it seems possible for a minor to successfully apply
for asylum under present INS procedure. The only issue would be whether a minor could then
maintain the grant of asylum if his parents objected on procedural due process grounds. It
appears that if dragged on long enough, most minors could delay any final determination until
they reached the age of majority at which point they would be able to maintain the grant
irrespective of their parents' wishes.

